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Governance-technology co-evolution and misalignment  




This paper explores some reasons why the alignment between governance and technology in infrastructures may be 
unstable or not easy to achieve. Focusing on the electricity industry, we claim that the decentralization of governance – 
an  essential  step  towards  a  decentralized  technical  coordination  -  may  be  hampered  by  if  deregulation  magnifies 
behavioural uncertainties and asset specificities; and that in a technically decentralized system, political demand for 
centralized coordination may arise if the players are able to collude and lobby, and if such practices lead to higher 
electricity rates and lower efficiency. Our claims are supported by insights coming from approaches as diverse as 
transaction cost economics, the competence-based view of the firm, and political economy. 
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This  paper  explores  some  reasons  why  the  alignment  between  governance  and  technology  in 
infrastructures, as defined e.g. by Finger, Groenewegen and Kunneke (2005) and Ménard (2009), 
may  not  be  stable.  Focusing  on  the  electricity  industry,  we  claim  that  the  decentralization  of 
governance – an essential step towards a decentralized technical coordination - may be hampered by 
if deregulation magnifies behavioural uncertainties and asset specificities; and that in a technically 
decentralized system, political demand for centralized coordination may arise if the players are able 
to collude and lobby, and if such practices lead to higher electricity rates and lower efficiency. Our 
claims are supported by insights coming from approaches as diverse as transaction cost economics, 
the competence-based view of the firm, and political economy. 
In recent years, a process of deep transformation has interested the network industries, defined as 
“industries characterized by the delivery of products or services to final consumers via a ‘network 
infrastructure’,  linking  upstream  supply  with  downstream  consumers.”  (European  Commission 
2001). Liberalization, regulation, deregulation, and privatization together define a new scenario in 
telecommunications, energy, rail transportation, and water systems, previously run under regimes of 
strictly regulated or publicly-owned vertically integrated monopolies. The regulatory framework 
(regulation),  generally  associated  with  a  transfer  of  property  rights  (privatisation),  is  aimed  at 
reducing  or  avoiding  entry  barriers  (liberalization)  in  order  to  trigger  welfare  gains,  but  it  is   3 
supposed to disappear once the market works (deregulation), unless the exercise of market power 
by incumbents  asks for new forms of governance control (reregulation). 
The privatization programmes of the last twenty years have significantly reduced the economic 
role  of  state-owned  enterprises  in  most  countries,  although  with  mixed  effects  on  the  overall 
efficiency and profitability of the transformed industries (see various contributions in Roland, 2008, 
and Megginson and Netter, 2001, for a contrary view). In other words, there has been a shift from 
the nation state to the competition state “using new forms of economic intervention intended to 
marketize the state itself as well as to promote the competitive advantage of national industrial and 
financial activities within a relatively open world economy” (Cerny, 1992). Behind this political 
choice we find theorists belonging to the Libertarian view, that can be grouped in the “New Right” 
philosophy, with a strict preference for free markets and a residual role for welfare state (Barr, 
1993).  
The  economic  mainstream  identifies  at  least  two  rationales  behind  industry  restructuring, 
involving different interpretations of technology. On the one hand, a return to market governance is 
sometimes  viewed  as  the  ideal  mean  to  foster  competitiveness  and  innovation  in  network 
infrastructures against monopoly rents. In such a perspective, one views technology as a “plastic” 
substance ready to be shaped by market-driven incentives to innovation. On the other hand, the 
contestability of natural monopoly features, theorized e.g. by Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982), 
seemed to become reality when sunk costs remarkably declined in telecommunications, and the 
combined  cycle  technology  allowed  for  drastic  reduction  in  the  minimum  efficient  scale  for 
electricity  generation  (Kunneke  1999).  Technical  change,  in  this  view,  has  brought  the 
infrastructures closer to perfect competition, and therefore enabled the return to market governance. 
Yet, the relationship between institutional design and industry performance in infrastructures 
proceeds from the particular features of those sectors, involving technologies characterized by large 
specific sunk investments, economies of scale and scope, path dependencies, lock-in effects, high 
degree of complementarities between technical components, externalities, and mass consumption. 
These features are at the core of contractual problems that have traditionally raised the need for 
governmental regulation and, at the same time, provide governments (either national or local) with 
the incentives to behave opportunistically vis-à-vis the investing companies (Holburn and Spiller, 
2002, pp. 465-466). The ongoing deregulation and re-regulation processes are therefore challenging 
at many levels. From the incumbent operator’s perspective, the exposure to competition requires 
fundamental organizational and managerial changes. At the sector level, technological innovation 
and consumer demand, on the one hand, and underinvestment on the other hand, exert conflicting 
pressures on the quality of the infrastructures, as well as on their upgrading and the related services.   4 
At the political level, there is a need for new regulation to accompany the liberalization process and 
to ensure that the advantages expected from competition ultimately accrue to the general public.  
The  outlook  on industry  restructuring may change once we  recognize that, because of  such 
features  of  infrastructures,  it  is  difficult  to  provide  best  solutions  or  to  identify  “superior” 
institutional rules. The complexity of the answer comes from the impossibility of disentangling 
organizational  and  technological  factors.  It  has  been  recently  argued  that  the  performance  of 
network  industries  bears  a  functional  relationship  with  the  degree  of  coherence  or  alignment 
between  technology  and  the  mode  of  organization  (Finger,  Groenewegen  and  Kunneke,  2005; 
Finger and Kunneke, 2006; Kunneke, 2008; Kunneke and Finger, 2009; Ménard, 2009). In this 
approach,  performance  gains  related  to  the  exploitation  of  new  technologies  –  and  the  very 
technical functioning of infrastructures – can be fully reaped only if technology is supported by 
suitable institutional regimes. At the same time, recent problems in the technical functioning of 
liberalized  infrastructures  have  probably  derived  from  liberalizations  focused  on  institutional 
change  with  technology  taken  as  purely  exogenous  or  merely  reactive  (see  the  Hatfield  train 
accident occurred in the UK in 2000, and the large black-outs in North America from the 1980s 
onwards).  
We believe that the coherence approach to network infrastructures is a very promising research 
line,  within  the  respected  tradition  of  studies  on  the  co-evolution  between  technology  and 
institutions (Nelson, 1994; Perez, 2002; Von Tunzelmann, 2004). Finger and Kunneke (2009) have 
listed a number of unresolved issues in this literature, concerning (i) how to measure coherence, (ii) 
through which mechanisms coherence affects performance, and (iii) which actors carry out the 
alignment, and how the alignment is influenced by incentives and competences. A fourth and quite 
critical question is: under which conditions is the governance-technology alignment feasible and 
stable?  In  other  words,  are  there  endogenous  forces  that  prevent  the  mutual  adaptation  of 
governance and technology? 
In  this  paper,  we  explore  some  reasons  why  governance  and  technology  in  the  electricity 
industry can be persistently misaligned, according to three main lines of thought: transaction cost 
economics,  the  competence-based  view  of  the  firms,  and  political  economy.  First,  we  analyze 
circumstances  in  which  the  costs  of  electricity  transactions  may  increase  due  to  risk  and 
transactional  uncertainties  engendered  by  the  deregulation  process.  In  particular,  high  human 
specificities  required  in  risk  management  may  discourage  the  participation  of  small  power 
generating companies in critical transactions, such as power balancing, creating an effective lower 
bound to market concentration. Coupled with coordination problems in the upgrading of the power 
grid, large power generating companies may retain their ability to exert opportunistic behaviours,   5 
causing demand for vertical integration by distribution companies. Second, because of competence 
gaps and asymmetries, governance choices are dictated not only by transaction cost economizing, 
but also by the quest for comparative advantages enabled by differences in knowledge bases. As an 
outcome, firms who do not align their governance to the prevailing technological paradigm may 
still  be  profitable  and  survive.  Finally,  the  alignment  between  decentralized  governance  and 
technology may be unstable if it gives rise to conflicting interests. This can happen if self producers 
are  large  enough  to  collude  and  to  effectively  lobby  the  regulatory  authorities.  The  resulting 
increase in power rates may stimulate political demand for vertically integrated governance and 
centralized technical coordination. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on governance-technology 
alignment  in  network  infrastructures.  Section  3  relies  on  transaction  cost  economics,  the 
competence-based  view  of  the  firm  and  political  economy  considerations  to  understand  the 
sustainability of market governance in network industries. Conclusions are in Section 4. 
 
2. The coherence approach to network industries   
 
Infrastructures provide essential services to society through very complex technical, economic, and 
political systems, whose complexity is strongly related to the network features of these sectors. 
Such systems have to be coordinated over a large geographic area, involving different technologies 
and  standards,  as  well  as  numerous  economic  and  political  actors  with  diverse  objectives  and 
interests.  Network  industries  perform  critical  functions,  defined  as  functions  which  imply  a 
sufficiently wide technical scope, are unique, and involve time constraints (Kunneke et al., 2010). 
Incorrectly  performing  such  critical  functions  would  cause  system  failure  and  disruptions.  The 
transactions which are essential to accommodate critical functions are called critical transactions. 
Examples  include  the  production,  transportation  and  distribution  of  water,  traffic  control  in 
railways, load balancing in the electricity system – as opposed to ancillary transactions such as 
connection, metering and billing of water consumption, or ticket sales in the rail transportation 
sector (Ménard, 2009). Critical transactions are essential to maintain the integrity of the technical 
functions  while  keeping  the  system  economically  viable.  However,  critical  functions  can  be 
accomplished only if the industry is able to mobilize the required investments, competences and 
participation through appropriate modes of organization.  
Following this insight, one recent line of research has addressed the issue of coherence 
between organizational and technological solutions in the management of critical transactions, with 
the goal to guarantee high systemic performance (Finger, Groenewegen and Kunneke, 2005; Finger 
and  Kunneke,  2006;  Kunneke,  2008;  Mènard,  2009;  Kunneke  and  Finger,  2009;  Kunneke,   6 
Groenewegen and Ménard, 2010). This research line maintains that the choice of the appropriate 
modes of organization of the critical transactions is crucial to enhance the performance of network 
industries. Governance and technology are said to be coherent or aligned if they rely on comparable 
coordination  mechanisms,  scope  of  control,  and  speed  of  adjustment.  For  instance,  top-down 
decision processes would  be coherent  with technologies involving  centralized control and high 
speed of adjustment. By the same token, competitive markets would be coherent with distributed 
technical control and longer planning horizons.  
The  coherence  approach  to  network  industries  postulates  the  existence  of  a  functional 
relationship between the degree of governance-technology alignment and the technical and socio-
economic performance of the infrastructures, including efficiency, reliability (or integrity of the 
technical system), and safeguard of public values. First of all, network features imply technical and 
economic specificities that determine the occurrence of market failures. The fundamental problem 
becomes  how  to  cope  with  network  complementarities.  The  solution  could  be  to  focus  on 
economies of system (taking the system as the unit of analysis) rather than on economies of scale. 
Moreover,  the  economic  organization  of  infrastructures  must  adopt  static  efficiency,  dynamic 
efficiency and system efficiency as economic criteria to monitor the infrastructure performance and 
to reveal the existence of inefficiencies. Secondly, because infrastructures provide essential goods 
and services, technical integrity must be included in the performance options, along with the double 
perspective of consumer and general interest. Finally, one is obliged to safeguard public values and 
national interests, such as Universal Service Obligations and environmental quality. To ensure high 
infrastructure  performance,  the  relevant  system  functions  (interconnection,  interoperability, 
capacity and system management) require specific governance mechanisms that must derive from 
coherence between technical and institutional coordination.  
The coherence approach represents a twist with respect to the mainstream discussion on the 
liberalization of infrastructures, wherein technology and institutions are approached independently 
(Finger, Groenewegen and Kunneke, 2005, p. 228). For instance, Spiller and Tommasi (2008) argue 
that the debate on utility regulation has been characterized more by distributional aspects than by 
the importance of adaptation to technological shocks. Such an efficiency-enhancing perspective has 
viewed technology alternatively as a constant (which is the case only in some sectors, e.g. water 
systems),  an  enabling  factor  (see  the  case  against  natural  monopoly  after  the  introduction  of 
combined cycle technology in power generation) or a “plastic” substance readily shaped by market-
driven  incentives  to  innovation.
1  Technology  in  the  coherence  approach  co-evolves  with 
                                                
1 See also Dosi (1982, 1988) on the status of technology in mainstream economic theory.   7 
institutions:  the  opportunities  for  institutional  reforms  in  network  infrastructures  dynamically 
influence (and are influenced by) the properties of the existing technological regime. 
Kunneke  (2008)  provides  a  coherence-based  interpretation  of  the  restructured  electricity 
industry.  He  argues  that,  because  of  its  broad  scope  of  control  and  its  top-down  technical 
coordination, the centralized generation (CG) paradigm is misaligned with the newly introduced 
market-based  governance  structures,  with  likely  adverse  effects  on  the  system  performance. 
Distributed  generation  (DG),  defined  as  an  electric  power  source  connected  directly  to  the 
distribution network or on the customer side of the meter (Ackermann et al. 2001), matches with 
coordination mechanisms characterized by decentralized interaction and limited scope of control, 
such as the market, due to its small scale (usually below 50 MW) and modularity.
2  
One  can  formalize  Kunneke’s  argument  by  assuming  that  there  exist  four  governance-
technology pairs: (H, CG), (H, DG), (M, CG), and (M, DG) – where H stands for “hierarchy”, M 
for “market”. A performance function maps the four governance-technology pairs into a certain 
indicator  of industry  performance.
3 Performance  is assumed  increasing in  the  coherence  of the 
governance-technology couples. Therefore, the performance of (H, CG) and (M, DG) – which are 
aligned - is higher than the performance of (H, DG) and (M, CG) – misaligned. In the decades prior 
to restructuring, the electricity industry in most countries was in the (H, CG) state,
 4 while after 
restructuring  it  can  be  thought  of  being  in  the  (M,  CG)  state,  as  the  value  chain  has  been 
disintegrated, but DG technologies are still scarcely diffused. Concerning the transition between 
states, Kunneke depicts two possible scenarios. In the first, the electricity industry sticks to the 
centralized generation paradigms, and the alignment is carried out by institutions: this may occur 
through  a  revival  of  vertical  integration  and  publicly  managed  firms,  or  through  long-term 
contracts.  In  the  alternative  scenario,  market  governance  stimulates  the  transition  towards  the 
decentralized generation paradigm, aided by developments in complementary telecommunication 
and ICT systems. Clearly, the former can be seen as a transition from (M, CG) to (M, DG), whereas 
the latter is a move from (M, CG) to (H, CG).  
Overall, one can interpret Kunneke’s aligned governance-technology pairs as equilibria, and 
his scenarios as possible out-of-equilibrium adjustment dynamics triggered by an event that gave 
rise to misalignment – e.g. industry restructuring which mandated a move from hierarchical to 
market-based governance structures. Such an adjustment process may cover an extended time span, 
                                                
2 Related concepts are smart grids and combined heat-power (CHP). With smart grids, load balancing is shifted from 
the  high-voltage  transmission  grid  to  low-voltage  distribution  networks.  CHP,  also  known  as  cogeneration,  is  a 
technology using a heat engine or a power station to simultaneously generate electricity and heat. Both smart grids and 
CHP are usually considered as parts of the DG paradigm. Kunneke’s (2008) work focused on CHP. 
3 This is just a stylized version of Kunneke’s (2008) model. Nevertheless, hybrid governance structures are considered 
by Kunneke, suggesting that he has in mind a continuous of governance structures between market and hierarchy. 
4 But not all: see the historical study of Van der Vleuten and Raven (2001) on Denmark.    8 
due  to  institutional  inertia  and  to  the  gradual  nature  of  technological  diffusion.  The  current 
misalignment between centralized power generation and market-based governance may therefore be 
viewed as a temporary departure from equilibrium, which endogenous forces will correct – perhaps 
aided by policy and sources of technical change which are exogenous to the electricity industry. A 
shift to market-based governance, for instance, may provide high-powered incentives for research 
into DG (according to demand-pull theories of innovation), or it may powerfully select among 
supply-pushed innovations (a view more palatable for the evolutionary theorists). 
In Kunneke and Finger (2009), technology responds to institutional change and, in turn, 
creates demand for new institutional arrangements. The authors argue that, as vertical integration 
eroded into an unbundled value chain, the emergence of diffused property rights – an outcome of 
liberalization and deregulation – has transformed the infrastructures into common pool resources.
5 
The  implication  is  that  traditional  approaches  of  strict  governmental  regulation  or  even  public 
ownership are no longer possible under the conditions of sector re-regulation and technological 
innovation resulting in an even stronger fragmentation of the system. But also the stronger reliance 
on competition and private sector involvement in liberalized infrastructures does not lead to socially 
desirable outcomes. Hence, neither governmental intervention nor the markets are able to cope with 
the  newly  arising  common  pool  resource  problems  in  these  essential  infrastructure  sectors, 
suggesting the need for a ‘third way’ of regulating infrastructures next to (or even beyond) markets 
and governmental involvement, with possible local initiatives or the involvement of communities in 
the governance of resources (Kunneke and Finger, 2009, p. 18). 
Ménard  (2009) offers useful hints  as to  who  carries out  the alignment process,  with an 
application  to  the  water  sector.  In  his  work,  technology  has  an  impact  on  the  (mis)alignment 
between  modes  of  organization  and  their  institutional  framework.  The  coherence  of  critical 
infrastructures, i.e. their capacity to align their organizational structure to the technical requirements 
as  well  as  to  the  attributes  of  the  core  transactions,  depends  on  intermediary  devices  (micro-
institutions) that articulate the rules defined at the broad institutional level with the specific modes 
of organization adopted. Such micro-institutions maintain a coherent system if they provide both 
formal  and  informal  dispute  resolution  devices  and  coordination  mechanisms  between  the 
organizations  involved,  while  keeping  transaction  costs  at  a  sustainable  level.  The  regulatory 
governance observed in each sector is a function of the degree of complexity in implementing and 
                                                
5 According to Kunneke and Finger (2009), infrastructures can be seen as non excludable resources, for at least three 
reasons. First, infrastructures might be spread through a huge geographical area with difficult to monitor access points, 
like  for  instance  public  road  systems.  Second,  even  if  the  access  could  be  technically  monitored,  there  might  be 
politically motivated universal service obligations, since infrastructures provide essential services like drinking water, 
energy or means of communication. Third, once the users have entered the network, it might be difficult or even 
impossible to precisely determine the services they appropriate from the network (Kunneke and Finger, 2009, p 5 e 6).   9 
monitoring an organizational solution that, depending on the interactions between the transactions 
at  stake  and  the  maintenance  of  the  technical  integrity  of  the  system,  plays  a  central  role  in 
conditioning the functioning and performance of network systems.  
 
3   Possible “missing links” in the coherence approach    
In this section we explore some reasons why the “aligned” governance-technology pairs are not 
likely to prevail in the electricity industry even after deregulation. First, we show that transaction 
costs may in fact increase because of behavioural uncertainties and specificities caused or at least 
not mitigated by the deregulation process. Second, the competence-based view of the firm implies 
that governance choices are dictated by comparative advantages as well as by transaction costs. 
Because of competence gaps and asymmetries, “non-aligned” governance-technology pairs may 
still  be  profitable  and  survive  in  the  population  of  firms.  Finally,  interest  groups  politics  may 
condition the mode and time of governance and the technological adaptation process due to rent 
seeking activities. 
 
3.1  How transactions are re-parameterized by the institutional reforms 
The analysis of coherence between governance and technology is usually cast in Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE). Williamson (1975, 1985) proposed that, in order to economize on transaction 
costs,  firms  align  their  governance  to  three  attributes  of  the  transactions:  asset  specificity, 
behavioural uncertainty, and frequency. Transaction costs are extremely relevant in the context of 
network industries, whose core transactions present four main specificities (Glachant and Finon, 
2000):  (1)  site  specificity  (the  output  of  the  production  process  cannot  easily  be  moved);  (2) 
physical specificity (the procedure or product is made to a specific standard); (3) dedicated assets 
(the production facility has no other use); and (4) temporal specificity (adjusting production to 
consumption requires just-in-time synchronisation). 
The TCE predictions on governance are typically made through a comparison of discrete 
alternatives  –  hierarchy,  hybrids,  market  –  holding  constant  technology  and  the  institutional 
environment. In a sense, the transaction cost curves depicted in Williamson (1985) are invariant 
through institutional reforms – or, at least, such variations are frozen in order to isolate the sheer 
impact  of  transaction  attributes  (e.g.  asset  specificity).  However,  a  change  in  the  institutional 
environment can be interpreted as a change in the constraints faced by the economic organizations 
when  choosing  their  governance  modes  -  in  line  with  the  view  that  institutions  “constrain  the 
available actions” and that “institutions parameterize the environmental state variables”, among 
which transaction costs are major instances (Coriat and Dosi, 1998; see also Hodgson, 1998; Dosi,   10 
1995). This is suggesting that transactions can be created, transformed and destroyed by the very 
process of industry restructuring.  
Based on these insights, hereby we argue that the electricity industry restructuring process 
may  have  increased  the  costs  of  electricity  transactions  and  generated,  as  a  by-product,  new 
rationales for the adoption hierarchical governance structures - therefore making “decentralized” 
coherence unlikely and discouraging market participation. We have identified three channels of 
influence:  the  fragmentation  of  supply,  the  sequential  nature  of  industry  restructuring,  and  the 
openness to international competition.  
Supply  fragmentation.  Deregulation  has  triggered  processes  of  vertical  and  horizontal 
fragmentation  of  the  electricity  supply,  leading  to  a  more  lively  dynamics  of  entry,  exit,  and 
corporate  control  events,  as  well  as  to  more  experimentation  by  power  companies  with  offer 
strategies and, somewhat related, to magnified price volatility and volumetric risk.   
One of the goals of the deregulation process in electricity was indeed to remove the barriers 
to entry in those segments where competition is deemed workable, such as power generation. The 
use of market-based governance in the vertical relationships (between generating companies and 
distribution companies) could be stimulated: because of lower market concentration in the power 
generation  segment,  generating  companies  would  be  entitled  less  room  for  opportunistic 
behaviours. Yet, the correlation between market concentration and market power in electricity is 
highly imperfect, as it heavily depends on the configuration of power loads in the transmission grid. 
The market tends to work fairly competitively when the grid is not congested, only to result in a 
constellation of local monopolists and oligopolists as the power load grows large with respect to the 
total capacity of the system (see von der Fehr and Harbord, 1992, for a simple formalization of this 
idea).  The  implication  is  that  deregulation  can  tame  opportunistic  behaviours  only  if  the 
transmission capacity is appropriately upgraded to avoid congestion. But this in turn requires the 
coordination of workably competitive segments (such as power generation) with segments which 
are  still  characterized  by  natural  monopoly  features  (i.e.  power  transmission).  However,  such 
coordination is not granted in a decentralized system.   
The inability to curb market power is also among the determinants of increased volatility in 
wholesale power prices, reaching unprecedented high levels. Electricity market organizers reacted 
to this phenomenon by creating a sequence of markets, beginning with rather long-term forwards 
and ending with the load balancing market, where critical transactions (in the sense of Mènard) take 
place. In a way, the goal was to stimulate a carefully planned schedule of offers and bids – by and 
large accounting for the “predictable” component of power loads - and let the balancing mechanism 
deal with just the “irregular” or “unpredictable” load fluctuations which occur in the very short   11 
term. At the same time, such a structure also meets the newly emerged demand for hedging. This is 
a clear example of how new transactions can be created by institutional change: while balancing 
was  a critical function even before restructuring, such a long  sequence of markets  as  we now 
observe was not needed, when vertical integration guaranteed greater coordination.     
In the liberalized setting, electricity producers need to develop trading capabilities in order 
to fully exploit the profit opportunities along the sequence of forward and spot electricity markets. 
Particularly when financial transactions are involved (as with financial futures), specialized analysts 
are  required  to  support  the  decision  processes.  If  this  involves  high  human  asset  specificities, 
transaction cost economics would suggest that financial services should be internalized. This seems 
to be the case with balancing mechanism routines. But setting up a financial office involves fixed 
costs, which smaller players may be unable to afford. In an empirical study on the Texas balancing 
mechanism,  Hortaçsu  and  Puller  (2008)  find  that  offer  strategies  by  firms  with  smaller  stakes 
significantly  depart  from  the  benchmark  of  static  profit  maximization.  Hortaçsu  and  Puller 
conjecture that smaller companies find it very costly to embark in balancing transactions, therefore 
they submit very steep supply schedules because they wish their offers to be rejected. But such a 
lack of participation by small players prevents the balancing market from reaching a sufficiently 
high degree of competition. Thus the larger companies retain their ability to exercise opportunistic 
behaviours. In these circumstances, distribution companies may be better off if they could integrate 
back in the generation segment.    
Complexity,  modularity  and  transactions.  The  electricity  industry  can  be  seen  as  a 
complex  system,  that  is,  following  Simon  (1962),  a  system  including  a  large  number  of  parts 
(plants, lines, market segments, companies, consumers) that interact in a nonsimple way, where the 
whole is more than the sum of the parts. Indeed, due to complex interdependencies, a sharp drop in 
the electricity system performance occurs even if only one part fails, while all the others function 
correctly.  
In a modularity view  of the electricity industry, both liberalization  and the diffusion  of 
decentralized  generation  technologies  can  be  seen  as  processes  of  (re)modularization  of  the 
electricity system. On the one hand, liberalization involves partitioning property rights among the 
electricity industry participants. Think of plant divestitures by incumbent generating companies, or 
vertical separation between generation and distribution. On the other hand, in a system dominated 
by  distributed  generation,  the  electricity  users  would  depend  much  less  on  power  distributed 
through the centralized grid. As these facts may suggest, decentralization would imply a higher 
degree of modularity or decomposability of the system. In dynamic terms, this may not be desirable, 
since nondecomposable systems tend to reveal errors and failures more quickly and more visibly,   12 
thereby stimulating learning by doing (Langlois 2002). A prospective investor therefore would face 
lower  rates  of  cost  reduction  under  the  DG  paradigm,  and  would  rather  opt  for  centralized 
generation in spite of the fact that industry restructuring allows for decentralized governance. This 
would give rise to misalignment between governance and technology. 
In addition to increasing the modularity of the electricity system, we have previously noted 
that new market segments have been created  in the wake of electricity  liberalizations, such as 
markets for energy derivatives. To use Baldwin and Clark’s (1997) terminology, the power system 
architecture is changing, as modules are created and/or updated, and the addition of new modules 
necessarily implies the creation of new interfaces among them. In particular, transactions can be 
seen as a specific kind of interfaces. While the system is increasingly subdivided in finer partitions, 
the  interactions among  the  growing  number  of  modules  become  more  and  more  intricated.  As 
argued by Glachant and Perez (2009), even after restructuring the electricity industry modules are 
not independent in the short run, not even approximately, unlike in nearly separable (Simon, 1962) 
or perfectly modular (Baldwin and Clark, 1997) systems.  
While this seems to be generally true, it turns out that electricity restructuring has taken 
widely different routes across countries, with significant differences in the sequence, timing, and 
pace (see Glachant and Perez, 2009, for a detailed phenomenology). From the viewpoint of an 
electricity company facing the choice whether to invest in distributed generation facilities, this is a 
source of uncertainty: looking at solutions adopted abroad provides little guidance, and may even be 
misleading. Firms can hardly predict what segment will be reformed next, nor can they foresee the 
“when”  and  “how”  of  further  reforms.  If  it  is  true  that  transactions  (or  interfaces)  are  re-
parameterized  by  institutional  change,  a  sort  of  second-order  transactional  uncertainty  may  be 
engendered, i.e. uncertainty on the properties of the transactions that the firm will be involved in 
after each step in the restructuring process. Such heterogeneity also highlights that the adoption of 
ready-to-use  solutions  taken  from  abroad  can  generate  failures  because  it  reflects  a  de-
contextualised approach. As argued by Shirley (2005), path dependency and the stickiness of beliefs 
and norms explain why policy problems in a country cannot be overcome by simply importing 
institutions that were successful in other countries.  
International  asymmetries  in  transaction  experience.  As  a  third  major  consequence  of 
restructuring, the new setting allows for internationalization: in each country, domestic companies 
face competition by foreign players who invest in local production and distribution facilities. One 
example is given by the British electricity market, where foreign companies – such as Electricité de 
France  and  E.On  -  are  nowadays  major  players.  However,  the  cross-national  heterogeneity  in 
reform paths implies that at any given point in time, there is a skewed distribution of transaction   13 
experience across countries. In particular, the incumbents in countries that implemented the reforms 
later are endowed with less experience in using the market, if compared with foreign companies.
6 
The  latter  may  be  better  able  to  exercise  opportunistic  behaviours.  Incumbents  in  the  laggard 
countries may therefore prefer to eschew purely market-based governance, in favour of governance 
arrangements that are closer to hierarchy.  
 
3.2 From external to internal adaptation: The role of competences 
The coherence approach to network infrastructures is a legitimate offspring of evolutionary thinking 
and  competence-based  views  of  the  firm.  Nelson  and  Winter  (1982)  argued  that  “skills, 
organization and technology are intimately intertwined in one functioning routine and it is difficult 
to say exactly where one aspect ends and another begins”. In their comparison of the TCE and 
competence-based approaches, Dosi and Marengo (1999) suggested that “Trade-offs, balances and 
co-evolution between transaction-coordinating and problem-solving organisational procedures and 
arrangements are probably the most promising and yet almost entirely unexplored research area 
where TCE and CP can meet.” In the same vein, Teece (1982, 1986) viewed competence as a co-
determinant of transaction costs, and inspired later works that combined TCE and competences to 
analyze the “make or buy” decision (see Silverman, 1999; Jacobides and Hitt, 2005; Jacobides and 
Winter, 2005). The usefulness of a competence-based approach for understanding governance was 
highlighted by Williamson himself, who recommended that the traditional TCE query “‘What is the 
best generic mode (market, hybrid, firm) to organize X’ be replaced by the question ‘How should 
firm A -- which has pre-existing strengths and weaknesses (core competences and disabilities) -- 
organize X?’” (Williamson, 1999, p. 1103; see also Langlois and Foss 1999 for a discussion of 
capabilities and governance). Within the coherence approach, this route is followed by Kunneke 
(2008), who pays attention to internal adaptation by discussing the coherence between governance 
and technological routines (in the sense of Nelson and Sampat, 2001). Hereby our aim is to explore 
some  implications  of  the  competence-based  view  of  the  firm  for  the  governance-technology 
alignment of infrastructures.  
Economic  theory  –  including  TCE  –  tends  to  assume  that  economic  organizations  are 
endowed with full competence, therefore ignoring that economic and organizational competence 
may be scarce and heterogeneous (Pelikan, 1988). The competence-based view of the firm, instead, 
recognizes  the  existence  of  competence  asymmetries  and  gaps,  within  the  broader  notion  of 
procedural uncertainty as introduced by Dosi and Egidi (1991). One major source of heterogeneity 
in firms’ problem-solving abilities resides in the path-dependent nature of organizational learning, 
                                                
6 See also Mayer and Argyres (2004), who discuss how contracting experience affects vertical scope.   14 
through which competences are cumulated (Winter, 1988). Path dependence is even more crucial 
when the activities to be carried out involve complex interactions and sunk and durable investments 
(Rivkin, 2001) – and indeed, this is the case with electricity and other network industries.  
A first implication of competence asymmetry for technology-governance coherence is grounded 
on Dosi and Marengo’s (1999) observation that competence heterogeneity explains the existence of 
“a  multiplicity  of  organisational  solutions  with  similar  overall  efficiency  but  very  different 
arrangements for coordination and problem solving, ranging from organisational arrangements with 
very effective problem-solving procedures but possibly high transaction costs to the opposite case 
of low transaction costs with low problem-solving efficiency”. Conversely, a TCE-based theory of 
coherence would predict that firms whose governance is aligned with technology enjoy greater 
profitability  and  hence  greater  likelihood  of  survival.  One  can  instead  imagine  that  there  is  a 
distribution of transactional competences across firms, so that not all firms make the “right” (TCE-
based) governance choice. Rather, firms with lower transactional competence are more likely to get 
the governance structure “wrong”. If one adds idiosyncratic differences in allocative, administrative 
and technical competences across firms, some (very competent) firms with the “wrong” governance 
structure may be more profitable than some (less competent) firms with the “right” governance 
structure.  As  a  result,  one  should  expect  to  persistently  observe,  say,  hierarchical  structures 
surviving on the market even when TCE would predict them to be inefficient.
7  
Quite in a similar vein, Jacobides (2008) and Jacobides and Winter (2005) argue that firms 
choose their governance structures in order to maximize the difference between the gains from trade 
and the transaction costs. The gains from trade – i.e. the benefits of using the market vis-à-vis 
hierarchy – are related to the diversity in knowledge bases across vertical segments. If knowledge 
bases upstream and downstream are similar, a firm has little to gain from using the market, even if 
the transaction costs are low. Low transaction costs motivate the use of the market only to the extent 
that a firm has weaker competences in one segment with respect to its potential counterparts in the 
other  segment:  it  is  such  asymmetry  that  creates  gains  from  specialization.  Indeed,  because 
technical and organizational competences are idiosyncratic, market governance implies interaction 
with other firms endowed with different abilities to solve problems (Madhok 2002). This highlights 
a population-based approach to governance: the make-or-buy decision of one firm depends on the 
distribution of competences in the population. As to the electricity industry, this argument would 
probably imply the adoption of hierarchical or quasi-hierarchical coordination modes, because the 
                                                
7 Clearly, this is only a static view. Dynamically, the chosen governance structure may partly constrain the deployment 
of  allocative,  administrative  and  technical  competences.  For  instance,  the  demand-pull  view  of  technical  change 
suggests that R&D incentives must be lower in a hierarchical organization, which is less responsive to market signals.   15 




3.3 Political and social network issues 
In his argument in favour of coherence between core transactions and technical functions, Ménard 
(2009) explicitly introduces the political dimension. He underscores that “the choice of a mode of 
organization and the institutional framework in which it is embedded is also tributary of social 
forces: the political economy of water systems matters greatly.” (Ménard, 2009, p. 91). Ménard is 
persuaded that technology and transactional factors together with political forces have an impact on 
the (mis)alignment between the modes of organization and their institutional framework (Ménard, 
2009, p. 91). Hence, the analysis of the interaction between politics and economics helps explaining 
the choices of sector governance, as the dynamics of network infrastructures involves multiple, 
possibly conflicting interests. We are thus inclined to believe that understanding the co-evolution 
between technology and governance requires a framework of analysis that, besides transactional 
factors and competences, accounts for the existence of social interactions between agents and of 
external pressures by interest groups. The foregoing ideas motivate the question: if lobbies are able 
to influence regulatory governance, does this affect the degree of governance-technology coherence 
in infrastructures? How policy biases inspired by interest groups (such as those analyzed by Stigler 
1971, Peltzman 1976, McCubbins et al. 1987) condition the achievement and persistence of aligned 
technological and organizational coordination mechanisms?  
One finds a number of historical examples of how social interactions matter in shaping the 
institutional and technological structure of the electricity industry. Granovetter and McGuire (1998) 
illustrated that in the early times of US electricity industry (1880-1925), the social influence of 
Thomas Edison, Samuel Insull and their collaborators was essential in establishing the centralized 
power generation paradigm, despite the fact that decentralized generation was no less efficient in 
economic  and  technical  terms.  Such  influence  was  exercised  through  industrial  associations, 
corporate  interlocks,  and  friendships.  Apparently,  the  very  supporters  of  centralized  power 
generation managed to impose the adoption of an electricity pricing system that, while inferior to 
others in efficiency terms, was best suited to their growth strategy (Yakubovich, Granovetter and 
McGuire, 2005).  
                                                
8 It has been argued (Eliasson 1990) that a powerful drive towards vertical integration resides in the lack of receiver 
competence in the market. In other words, a firm may prefer in-house production if it perceives that its potential market 
counterparts are unable to satisfy its needs. This argument may not apply to electricity production and services, given 
their high standardization.  
   16 
Such dynamics are by no means confined to the US. We have identified a historical case 
study about Italy showing that, if in a nearly decentralized system there are non-atomistic players 
who can exploit social ties, the ensuing consequences on system efficiency and on prices can trigger 
reactions by the social groups which are adversely affected. The sector drifts away from a nearly 
coherent  governance-technology  pair  due  to  endogenously  generated  dynamics  of  conflicting 
interest groups. In a sense, the equilibrium between technology and governance, once reached, can 
prove to be unstable. Our case study, drawn from Giannetti (1989), refers to the Italian electricity 
industry prior to its 1962 nationalization. As reported by the author, the Italian electricity system in 
the period 1946-1962 was not a single body, but was fragmented into many systems and enterprises. 
In 1946, there were 259 electricity companies operating in Italy, but actually only six companies 
controlled  54.4%  of  power  production.  Electric  companies,  private  or  semi-public  (such  as 
municipal companies) accounted on average for more than 70% of installed capacity and domestic 
production in the period 1946-1962. When nationalisation occurred, in 1962, in Italy there was 
almost  30%  of  capacity  in  the  hand  of  self-producers  that  were  mostly  large  companies  in 
chemistry, metals, traction, and textiles, as shown by Table 1. Such a relatively large share of self-
producers,  along  with  fragmented  ownership,  suggests  that  prior  to  nationalization  the  Italian 
electricity  industry  was  rather  close  to  “decentralized”  coherence  between  technology  and 
governance. 
 
Table 1. Total installed power in Italy (1946-1962) 
  1946  %  1954  %  1962  % 
Edison group  2137  25.3  3073  21.9  3870  16.8 
SIP group  857  10.1  1385  9.9  2791  12.1 
SADE group  526  6.2  1138  8.1  1477  6.4 
La Centrale group  261  3.1  961  6.9  1835  7.9 
SME group  446  5.3  1084  7.7  2137  9.3 
Bastogi Group  188  2.2  412  2.9  567  2.5 
AEM  426  5  739  5.3  1637  7.1 
Small electric companies  1137  13.5  1569  11.2  2066  8.9 
Total electric companies  5977  70.7  10362  73.8  16380  70.9 
             
Textile  229  2.7      412  1.8 
Paper  87  1      225  1 
Chemistry  414  4.9      1672  7.2 
Cement  4  0      138  0.6 
Metals  496  5.9      1138  4.9 
Others  869  10.3      1641  7.1 
Traction (Larderello)  212  2.5  590  4.2  526  2.3 
Total self-producers  2474  29.3  3669  26.2  6722  29.1 
Total electric companies+self-producers  8451  100  14031  100  23102  100   17 
Source: Giannetti's elaboration on Anidel data (1989) 
 
Despite the dispersed ownership, some authors (e.g. Scalfari, 1960) spoke of the electric trust as the 
core of the Italian monopolistic system, a “state in the state” with its financial alliances with the 
most important industrial groups as well as strong political linkages. Indeed, the electric groups 
engaged in lobbying activities. Giannetti (1989) has described the ability of the electric companies 
to exert a political influence:  
“The development of installed capacity in the period 1946-1962 was marked by a series of 
multi construction programs developed by electric companies and compiled on estimates of future 
consumption. The goals of these programs were different. On the one hand, they were a source of 
information used by electric companies to defend themselves against the criticisms of inefficiency 
(the  companies  were  accused  of  having  no  interest  to  engage  in  extensive  construction  plans 
because they preferred to use the differential rent of hydroelectric plants already written off). On the 
other hand, they served to highlight to the government companies’ financial needs and encourage an 
increase in tariff levels as well as grants and contributions. In sum, the development programs of the 
electrical systems were "political", aimed to address the attention of the government and of the 
political parties towards the situation of the sector and its financial needs in order to discourage the 
nationalization” (Giannetti, 1989, pp. 172-174, translated from Italian). 
Rather than competing and investing in technological improvements, the Italian electricity 
companies defended their rents, which were due to the lobbying activities described above and 
amplified the influence of the technical specificities of the electricity system. In particular, the large 
electricity  groups  and  the  self-producers engaged  in collusive  behaviours,  which  were  possible 
despite the dispersed ownership because, as mentioned before, self-producers were not atomistic 
(Giannetti 1989, pp. 179-180). Such collusive agreements aimed to determine an upward movement 
in  the  electricity  rates,  which  were  set  by  a  government  committee  based  on  cost  information 
declared by the electricity companies themselves. 
Such an upward pressure on electricity rates led to contrary interest groups which supported 
nationalization. For instance, Ernesto Rossi (1962) claimed that the full nationalization of the Italian 
electricity sector was needed in order to eliminate serious losses resulting from the plurality of 
electrical  feuds  and  disputes  between  them,  and  defend  users  from  exploitation  by  energy 
companies, that no public body in Italy could ever effectively monitor from outside. The creation of 
the State-owned vertically integrated monopolist Enel (Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica) in 
1962 can be interpreted as a move to break the producers’ rent positions behind the technological 
cartel and, therefore, improving the system efficiency of the electricity industry.    18 
What the case shows is that although the system included a large share of self-generation 
facilities,  the  six  main  electric  companies  serving  the  market  and  the  self-generators  colluded 
towards  an  organizational  and  technical  policies  model  based  mainly  on  self  governance  with 
limited state regulatory control, built upon friendships, family relations, and business and political 
linkages. All this impeded competition and blocked the tendency towards a pure commodity model, 
in the sense of a perfect matching between governance and technology. Moreover, the ability of 
investor-owned  utilities  to  escape  price  pressure  generated,  as  a  reaction,  a  demand  for 
nationalization emerged, causing the shift towards centralized governance and technology (ENEL 
was created in 1962 as a State-owned vertically integrated monopoly).  
This example recalls what is predicted by the relevant literature, namely that interest groups 
are involved in strategic interaction among political and administrative actors to exercise influence 
on  regulatory  policy  through  various  means.  One  way  is  by  obtaining  statutory  authority  and 
resources to take part in administrative procedures (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). On the other 
hand,  interest  groups  also  look  after  agency  behaviour  on  behalf  of  the  legislature  to  foster 
legislative  actions  aimed  at  preventing  agency  drift  (McCubbins  et  al.,  1987),  given  that 
incorporating dominant interest groups into agency procedures reduces the cost to the legislature of 
continuously monitoring agency decisions. Legislatures organize and publicly fund interest groups 
also to protect supportive but vulnerable groups against adverse future political environments, as 
testified by the creation of consumer advocates in the US (Holburn and Vanden Berg 2006). The 
cited authors note that consumers are likely to lobby more extensively for institutional reform in 
states  where  utility  charges  constitute  a  relatively  greater  proportion  of  income  and  where 
consumers are more concentrated. The incentive for interest groups to organize and to lobby for 
regulatory reforms increases as policies become more salient.
9 
As we have noted, the equilibrium between technology and governance, once reached, may not 
be stable, according to the role that interest groups exercise thanks to the gains ensured by the 
special economic features of network industries. As the literature on political economy of reforms 
has long underscored, it is the combination between the “three Is”- Institutions, interests and ideas - 
that, in our opinion, helps explaining why coherence cannot be attained, together with technological 
as well as other transactional factors. In sum, “regulators allocate benefits or wealth (higher rates or 
lower rates as the case may be) to either industry or consumers in a manner such that they build up 
their  political  support  and  power.  If  a  group  of  business  interests  is  growing  in  power,  as  a 
                                                
9 Concerning electric and gas utilities, Holburn and Vanden Berg (2006) observe that the impact of advocates on 
regulatory policy became stronger during the 1970s and 1980s, a period of considerable stress for the utility industries 
because, after four decades of continuous technological improvement and steadily decreasing average costs and rates, 
the electric and  gas  utilities  were  confronted  with  several  economic shocks  that  reversed  this  trend  (Holburn  and 
Vanden Berg, 2006).   19 
consequence, optimizing regulators will allocate more resources to these interests at the expense of 
other interests” (Cavazos, 2008, p. 256). 
The gradual increase in EU decision-making powers in recent years has fostered stakeholders’ 
activity  in  conditioning  Brussel’s  policy  choices.
10  The  strong  role  of  European  actors  in 
liberalisation and privatisation processes provoked the emergence of oligopolies at the European 
level, while once the level playing field for public utilities was exclusively domestic, as shown by 
the  Italian  historical  examples.  These  oligopolies  does  not  follow  from  a  pure  technological 
justification  (the  natural  monopoly  at  a  supranational  level)  but  are aimed  at  creating  political 
cartels able to affect the governance decisions in network regulation, especially with reference to 
penetration  into  non-domestic  markets.  The  European  system  of  public  utilities  offers  a  good 
example  of governance  structures not necessarily led  by technological advancements,  in which 
pressure groups, in form of powerful enterprises’ alliances, may be able to condition the markets 
architecture.  
 
4  Conclusions 
In this paper we have discussed the impact of transactional factors, technical competences and 
political  economy  arguments  on  the  governance-technology  alignment  paradigm  in  network 
industries, with a focus on the electricity sector.  
Starting  from  a  simple  transaction  cost  framework,  we  have  shown  that  the  process  of 
industry  restructuring,  far  from  evolving  necessarily  towards  decentralized  governance,  can 
powerfully transform the attributes of transactions in ways that call for a return to hierarchy or even 
discourage investments in these sectors. For instance, the fragmentation of electricity supply has 
generated price risks and the associated demand for hedging which involves significant human 
specificities.  Also,  the  sequential  nature  of  the  restructuring  process  creates  second  level 
uncertainties  concerning  the  timing  and  scope  of  further  reforms.  We  have  then  extended  our 
framework  to  include  asymmetries  in  technical  competencies  and  we  have  underlined  that 
heterogeneity among firms may allow the survival of governances structures that, according to 
transaction  cost  economics,  are  misaligned  with  technology.  Finally,  we  have  added  political 
economy considerations to the picture. Indeed, sector players entertain social interactions among 
themselves and with policymakers in order to seek rent positions and, in this way, they constrain the 
alignment between technology and governance. A historical example about the Italian electricity 
industry, prior to nationalisation, reveals that, even if decentralized technology was relevant in the 
                                                
10 The relevance of interest group activities within the European institutions has been studied by Gaeta (2010).   20 
system, the exploitation of social ties between power producers and self producers, promoted a de 
facto cartel, causing the government to abolish the existing decentralized governance. 
In a world characterized by increasing supranational regulatory frameworks and even more 
integrated  markets,  the  reduction  of  the  minimum  efficient  scale  which  would  justify  market 
governance is likely to coexist with increasing “political” scale which is needed to exert pressure at 
the supranational level. In conclusion, it seems to us that the co-evolution between governance and 
technology is a heavily non-linear process. A consistent assessment of the future directions of this 
co-evolutionary  process  has  to  take  into  account  both  sector  and  domestic  idiosyncrasies  (e.g. 
institutional complementarities) which can shed light on the relative weight of transactional aspects, 
competencies and political factors in driving governance choices and technological adaptations.  
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